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The Lisbon agenda was drawn up and adopted in Spring 2000 to bolster the growth, 
innovation and employment performance of the European Union while fostering the 
inclusiveness of its social models. These goals commanded, and still command, a wide 
consensus. 
Five years later, in Spring 2005, judging the results as “mixed”, heads of state and 
government chose to refocus priorities on growth and employment and decided to streamline 
the Lisbon process. The main features of the new process are a longer programming period, a 
single set of Integrated Guidelines, and the preparation by member states of National Reform 
Programmes (NRPs). 
The essential political choice behind these decisions was twofold. First, the failure of the first 
Lisbon strategy (Lisbon 1) was attributed neither to its goals nor to its principles, but rather to 
excessive complexity and inadequate process. Second, the lack of political commitment on 
the part of member states was regarded as a major shortcoming. Accordingly, the revised 
Lisbon strategy (Lisbon 2) put the accent on national ownership and adopted a more tailor-
made, bottom-up approach. 
Lisbon 2 is therefore both similar to and different from Lisbon 1. It is similar because the 
major aims have remained unchanged and because the very rationale of an open coordination 
of national reform policies has not been questioned. But it is different because some of the 
initial objectives have been downplayed and because the underlying governance model, where 
the European Commission played the role of a schoolmaster, has been abandoned in favour of 
one in which it plays the role of a coach. 
One year on, is the EU now on a better path? What are the chances that the revised Lisbon 
strategy will deliver the results that the initial one failed to deliver? These are the questions 
we intend to answer in this report. 
It is certainly early to provide an assessment. Though adopted, the NRPs have barely been 
implemented. Measurable first results can in the best of cases be expected only in 2008, at the 
end of the three-year cycle. Also, after a complex machinery was put in place last year, 
governments and the European Commission are still in a learning phase. Any evaluation must 
therefore be provisional. Yet as the Lisbon strategy can hardly afford to disappoint again, it is 
important to analyse, early on, whether it is on track to deliver the expected change. 
To achieve this aim, we start with a discussion of the rationale for a Lisbon-type coordinated 
strategy and of the challenges it needs to address (Section 1). We then turn in Section 2 to an 
assessment of the process as implemented in 2005-2006. We essentially base our evaluation 
on our reading of the National Reform Programmes and their evaluation by the Commission. 
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On the basis of this analysis, we draw conclusions and formulate recommendations in Section 
3. 
It is important to emphasise that we do not intend to provide any country-by-country 
assessment of the reform programmes or their implementation. Throughout this report, our 
focus is on the process as a whole. 
1.  Rationale and Challenges 
The Lisbon agenda was, and remains, political in essence. The growth, innovation, 
employment and social cohesion goals set out by the European Council were chosen to inspire 
a European economic and social revival. However, joint endeavours of this sort can only 
translate into action if supported by a precise definition of the common interest and a clear 
identification of the challenges arising from the diversity of situations and objectives. 
In this section, we wish to discuss three related issues: 
•  When is there justification for a coordination of national reform policies?  
•  Is there specific value in practising evaluation and coordination at the EU level?  
•  What are the challenges that an EU reform coordination process needs to address? 
1.1 Motives for acting jointly 
The motives for coordinating structural reform policies are of the same nature as those usually 
given to coordinate budgetary policies. They are also similar to those relied upon in the 
discussions on whether to allocate a given policy responsibility to the EU or the national 
level. In a nutshell, there can be two types of reasons to embark on coordination
2. 
First,  interdependence may render independent decision-making undesirable. This can be 
either because of spillover effects of national decisions, or because EU policies and national 
policies complement each other.  
Spillovers are clearly at work for Research and Development, whose benefits do not remain 
confined to the spending country (Annex 1). They are questionable for policies that aim at 
increasing the employment rate or at boosting productivity in areas where interdependence 
essentially stems from trade and capital markets: a country that succeeds in lowering 
structural unemployment or in increasing productivity generally does not significantly affect 
the performance of its neighbours. 
Complementarities are at work between product market reforms (the responsibility for which 
frequently belongs to the EU) and labour market reforms (which belong to the remit of the 
member states): for example, a combination of product market regulations that aim at 
favouring entry, and of labour market regulations that aim at preserving existing jobs (or vice-
versa), is a recipe for ineffectiveness.  
The second main reason for coordination is that governments and civil societies learn from 
the experiences of others. Such policy learning can be enhanced by initiatives that facilitate 
cross-country comparison and benchmarking. A telling example in this respect is the OECD 
evaluation of the performance of schoolchildren (PISA
3). By providing an objective and 
transparent assessment of the achievements of national education systems, the PISA 
programme helped detect shortcomings and fostered reform. Similarly, by providing an 
independent assessment, the European Commission can help member states sort out good 
from bad policies.    
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It is worth distinguishing these two types of arguments because they call for different forms 
of coordination. In the presence of spillover, there is a case for joint action, while policy 
learning merely requires mutual information and transparent assessments. The weights of 
these arguments also vary from one field to another. As regards the two main objectives of the 
new Lisbon agenda, the spillover argument is strong for R&D and the learning argument is 
strong for labour market policies.  
1.2 What is the specific EU dimension? 
Those arguments are, however, not specific to the EU. Actually, the practice of multilateral 
evaluation and coordination is by no means limited to the EU. The IMF prepares Article IV 
assessments which involve assessments of structural reform. The OECD does cross-country 
comparisons and assessments as well as country-by-country evaluations. It has recently 
developed a programme for the evaluation of structural reforms (Going for Growth
4), which 
relies on an extensive range of indicators and on a methodology for selecting country-specific 
priorities (Annex 1). Both essentially aim at fostering policy reform by learning. 
It is therefore important to determine what justifies undertaking at the European level, what 
could take place or is taking place in a different setting. We see two main reasons why the EU 
is special. In addition, there is a specific euro area dimension.  
The European dimension first stems from purely economic factors. Since the EU is more 
closely integrated than the world economy at large, interdependence within it is generally 
stronger. For example, knowledge and R&D spillovers or complementarities between product 
and labour market policies are more significant and also easier to deal with at the EU than at 
the OECD or the global level.  
The second justification is a political one. As a political entity, the EU has set itself goals 
whose achievement depends on concrete decisions by all member countries. A telling 
example is the target of reaching a level of R&D spending of 3% of GDP, which can only be 
achieved through the cooperation of all member states. More generally, the EU can be 
regarded as a club of like-minded countries with similar institutions (for example as regards 
the role of the state as an insurer against economic hazards), or similar preferences in the 
presence of trade-offs (such as efficiency vs. equity). Similar institutions and objectives make 
learning within the EU more expedient. For the same reason, participation in an EU-driven 
reform programme can be used as a commitment device whose potency derives from the 
strength of the domestic commitment towards the EU.  
All this applies to the EU as a whole. However, there is in addition a specific euro area 
dimension. In a monetary union, a country that reforms its labour market – say, lowers the 
unemployment threshold below which inflation accelerates – or its product market – say, 
increases the rate of growth of productivity – does exert an effect on its EMU partners, 
because the ECB is bound to lower its interest rate in response to a change that lowers the 
euro area inflation rate. However, the ECB can only react in proportion to the weight of that 
country in the euro area, which means that the country undertaking reform will benefit from a 
less forthcoming monetary environment than would have been the case in a monetary 
autonomy regime. Economic reform in one country lowers interest rates throughout the euro 
area, but the reforming country cannot benefit from the same macroeconomic support as in a 
flexible exchange rate regime. Since this may act as a reform trap, there is a motive for 
coordinating reforms among euro area countries
5.  
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Furthermore, specific reform priorities can arise from the objective of improving the 
functioning of the euro area: for example, to strengthen the channels of transmission of 
monetary policy or to make national economies more quickly responsive to a loss in 
competitiveness, especially in countries which have been experiencing higher-than-average 
inflation. Here again, there is a common interest in addressing such deficiencies, as persistent 
divergence within the euro area has the potential of greatly complicating the task of the ECB.    
1.3 Difficulties in designing a strategy 
To have identified motives for coordination is only a prerequisite for designing a common 
strategy. In practice, a major difficulty which needs to be addressed is that the member states 
of the EU are diverse.  
Structural heterogeneity is the trickiest challenge. The Lisbon strategy of 2000 was conceived 
for a relatively homogenous group of high income economies. After enlargement it now 
applies to a much more diverse group, and diversity is set to increase further with the future 
enlargements. Whether there is a common set of objectives and policies that are appropriate 
for all EU member states is an issue that needs to be addressed explicitly.   
Again, take R&D. The EU has an overall target for R&D spending, but how does it translate 
into objectives for the various member states? Should Finland, where R&D represents 3.5% 
of GDP, spend more, or less? Should Malta, where it represents 0.3%, spend more, or less? 
Recent research on the determinants of growth suggests that investment in research and 
higher education is essential for countries close to the technology frontier, but not for 
countries at an earlier stage of development
6. Furthermore, R&D spillovers imply spending 
should be concentrated where it is most efficient.  In the US, R&D intensity exceeds 5% in 
Maryland and Massachusetts but is as low as 0.5% in Louisiana
7. The dispersion is thus as 
large as in the EU, although income disparity is much less. This example suggests that from 
an overall efficiency standpoint, R&D should be concentrated where the aggregate return on 
each euro spent is the highest, which may involve spending less in some countries and more 
in other. 
Heterogeneity does not stop there, however. Besides structural heterogeneity, policy 
heterogeneity  must also be addressed. It makes policy priorities dependent on domestic 
institutions and flanking policies, even if the end-goal is the same.  
In addition to the euro dimension already mentioned, a case in point here is the labour market. 
Labour market institutions still vary a great deal from one country to another, with regards to, 
for example, the structure of wage negotiations or the features of unemployment insurance. In 
such a setting, gradual labour market reforms cannot respond to a ‘one size fits all’ 
prescription, since some well-intentioned reforms that deliver results in a given environment 
can be inefficient or even counterproductive in another one. To reach the same goal, priorities 
must be selected on a case-by-case basis.  
1.4 Conclusions 
Table 1 sums up our conclusions with regards to the main Lisbon objectives. Neither the 
motives for EU coordination nor the main difficulties that need to be addressed by the 
common strategy are identical for R&D spending and employment policies. In addition, the 
first domain does not involve a strong euro area dimension, while the second does.  
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Table 1: Rationale, challenges and dimension of EU coordination 
 R&D  Employment 
Main motive for EU coordination  Interdependence  Learning 
Main difficulty  Structural heterogeneity  Policy heterogeneity 
Euro area dimension  Weak  Strong 
 
This provides criteria for assessing the coordination process. In what follows, we will 
examine whether the new Lisbon strategy helps to identify and correct the weaknesses of 
independent policymaking; discuss whether it focuses on fields and objectives where there is 
a strong rationale for coordination and a specific European added value; analyse how the 
processes in place address the difficulties of structural and policy heterogeneity; and assess 
where there is a case for specific euro area action.  
 
2.  Analysing the Process 
We now turn from abstract to concrete, starting with a recap of the main changes introduced 
in 2005 to the Lisbon strategy (2.1). Since these changes were largely made in the name of 
national ownership, we begin our evaluation with an assessment of the degree to which there 
is now effective ownership in the Lisbon strategy and the National Reform Programmes (2.2). 
We then turn to the methodology issues involved in the evaluation of those programmes by 
the European Commission (2.3) and to our own assessment of this evaluation (2.4). 
2.1 From Lisbon 1 to Lisbon 2 
In March 2004, the European Council invited the Commission to establish a High Level 
Group headed by Wim Kok to carry out an independent review of the Lisbon strategy
8. 
The Kok report found that the European Union and its member states had clearly failed to 
implement the Lisbon strategy. This disappointing delivery was ascribed to an overloaded 
agenda and to shortcomings in governance. In the words of the report, “Lisbon is about 
everything and thus about nothing. Everybody is responsible and thus no one.” 
The Kok report proposed to remedy the delivery problem first of all by refocusing the 
strategy’s economic, social and environmental dimensions on growth and employment. The 
idea was not to abandon the social and environmental dimensions, but to recognise that 
growth and employment were essential “in order to underpin social cohesion and sustainable 
development”.  
As far as governance is concerned, the Kok report proposed a three-pronged approach:  
•  First, member states were asked to take ownership of the process and to commit 
themselves to delivering the agreed reforms by presenting national programmes, 
which should be subject to debate with national parliaments and social partners; 
•  Second, the Commission was asked to improve the central elements of the so-called 
open method of coordination – peer pressure and benchmarking – by delivering “in 
the most public manner possible” an annual league table of member state progress 
towards key targets.  Stronger reliance on “naming, shaming and faming” was thus 
advocated; 
•  Third, the EU common policies – including the EU budget – were invited to reflect 
more closely the Lisbon priorities. 
As the title of its Communication to the 2005 Spring European Council – Working Together 
for Growth and Jobs: A New Start for the Lisbon Strategy – amply demonstrates, the Barroso 
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Commission squarely adopted the recommendation of the Kok report to refocus the Lisbon 
strategy. The Commission also followed two of the three proposals made by the Kok report to 
improve governance. It proposed that member states present national programmes for growth 
and jobs, after broad discussion at national level. The Commission also proposed to better use 
the EU common policies, including the EU budget, in order to help implement the Lisbon 
strategy.  
However, the Commission strongly rejected the proposal to ‘name and shame’ and nearly 
abandoned benchmarking altogether. The reason for this was probably that the large member 
states (above all France and Germany) were determined – having just succeeded in trimming 
the wings of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) – that Lisbon would not be yet another 
thorn in their side. The Commission thus decided to stop lecturing the member states and to 
embark on a partnership with them instead.  
A few months later, the Council dealt a further blow to the Community involvement in the 
Lisbon strategy, when it rejected the EU budget proposal of the Prodi Commission, endorsed 
by the Barroso Commission, which envisaged a substantial increase in EU funding for 
research. The prospect of supporting the Lisbon strategy through budgetary incentives, which 
had been advocated by the Sapir report
9, was thus abandoned.  
At this stage, therefore, the question is whether the new Lisbon strategy can fly with a 
governance system that relies only on one of the three elements that were suggested by the 
Kok report. For the new governance regime, which rests almost exclusively on national action 
programmes - with little or no benchmarking and little or no EU funding - to deliver where 
the old set-up had failed, very significant advance in national ownership of the reform 
programmes would be necessary.  
2.2 Ownership of the National Reform Programmes 
Political ownership by member states was to be achieved by more intensive discussion within 
each country on national reform priorities and actions for meeting the Lisbon targets, 
culminating in the adoption of national reform plans. Such a more decentralised approach to 
the Lisbon agenda makes good sense in principle, not least in view of the large degree of 
diversity among member states that was mentioned earlier.  
Can such advances in ownership be observed in practice? To answer this question, we rely on 
the following three criteria: 
•  Criterion 1: Attention devoted to the development of National Reform Programmes 
(NRPs) by national governments.  
•  Criterion 2: Involvement of respective national parliaments and other stakeholders in 
the design and adoption of the reform programmes. 
•  Criterion 3: Media coverage surrounding the design and adoption of the NRPs, and the 
evolution of public perception regarding the targets of the Lisbon agenda in general 
and of national reform plans in particular. 
A comprehensive evaluation of these three criteria is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, 
we offer an indication with regards to the first two and provide informed speculation about 
the third one.  
Criterion 1: The Commission had called upon member states to appoint a “Mr or Ms Lisbon 
at government level”.
10 The inclination of member states to follow this recommendation can 
thus be regarded as a proxy for the level of attention devoted by national governments to the 
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development of national reform plans. It turns out that only 11 out of 25 countries
11 have 
followed the recommendation. In a majority of countries
12, the coordination of the preparation 
of the national reform plans was instead delegated to senior or even mid-level civil servants. 
This points in the direction of a failure of Lisbon 2 to inject political ownership in the process. 
Instead, it appears to have largely retained the bureaucratic character that marred Lisbon 1.  
Criterion 2: The involvement of national parliaments and other stakeholders is summarised in 
Annex Table 1 and Chart 1 below. The first notable feature is the great diversity of 
approaches among member states. It is striking that 9 out of 25 national governments did not 
even engage their respective parliaments at the committee level. Moreover, 18 out of 25 gave 
no indication at all on the potential follow-up to their reform programmes.  
It is instructive to also examine the overall ratings, which were obtained by simply adding the 
individual ratings for the four indicators (Parliament, Social Partners, Civil Society and 
Follow-up), with higher ratings pointing to better ownership performance (the maximum 
score is 12). The overall rating for new member states is substantially above the rating for old 
ones (6.8 versus 5.1). It is also noteworthy that the average rating is substantially smaller for 
the 6 large countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland and the UK) than for the 19 
smaller ones (4.7 versus 6.1). This suggests that the degree of ownership is in fact uneven and 
follows a systematic pattern.  
                                                 
11 Source: Radlo and Bates (2006), Table 3, plus own research for the member states not covered there.  
12 Three countries did not appoint a Mr./Ms Lisbon at all.   8
 
 
Criterion 3: Exploration in the standard media coverage databases suggests that while the 
Lisbon strategy is to a certain degree part of national policy debates, the design and adoption 
of the National Reform Programmes have received limited attention. The media attention 
received by the Lisbon strategy appears to derive mainly from its overall goals and each 
country’s relative performance in achieving them, rather than from the innovations of Lisbon 
2. This tentative conclusion is reinforced by the impression that even the media savvy 
national elites seem to be mostly unaware of the very existence of the NRPs, let alone the 
process of their preparation. National surveys would probably reveal, therefore, that the wider 
public in most member states has remained entirely unaware of the NRP process.   
In this context, it is worth noting that only Criterion 2 features in the European Commission’s 
assessment of the ownership of the national reform plans. The other two potential criteria 
were not explored. While it could be argued that a rigorous pursuit of Criterion 1 might have 
put the European Commission in a politically awkward position, it is less clear why Criterion 
3 was not explored, especially since the Commission has considerable experience with the 
analysis of media impact and polling.  
Overall, the level of national ownership is clearly disappointing, especially since it was meant 
as the principal innovation of Lisbon 2.  
 
2.3 The NRPs and their evaluation: methodology 
Lack of political ownership is certainly a weakness. But it could be argued that such an 
ownership can by nature only develop over time. After all, the Maastricht criteria or the 
Stability Pact started as purely technocratic devices, and only gradually gained in visibility 
and effectiveness. There is therefore a need to assess the intrinsic quality of the NRPs and of 
their evaluation.  
The discussion in Section 1 has shown that preparing and evaluating mutually consistent 
National Reform Programmes raises significant challenges. A good starting point is to assess 
whether the EU has been able to develop a methodology to deal with those challenges. Has an 
approach been articulated to decide on policy priorities in any given country? Have criteria 
been developed to determine the contribution of individual member states to common goals? 
What about the euro dimension? Without clarity on these points, the very time-consuming 
process of preparing and evaluating 25+1 reform programmes runs a substantial risk of 
adding little value in the end.  
The Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (2005-08) adopted by the Council in 2005 are 
in principle the main instrument for achieving coherence. They set out objectives to which all 
member states are expected to adhere and which should both ensure consistency and provide a 
basis for evaluating national programmes. The idea was to integrate two sets of guidelines 
that were not sufficiently coherent with one another in the past, the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines (BEPGs) and the Employment Guidelines.  
Unfortunately, the Integrated Guidelines are simply a juxtaposition of the BEPGs and the 
Employment Guidelines. Even worse, they comprise no less than 24 guidelines: six 
macroeconomic, ten microeconomic and eight employment guidelines, each of which 
includes several prescriptions that can be regarded as sub-guidelines.  
The main problem with the Integrated Guidelines is not their complexity, however. It is that 
they offer no direction as to which of the 24 guidelines should be pursued as priorities by 
individual member states. The heterogeneity challenge we have identified in Section 1 is thus   9
not addressed and the same prescriptions are offered to all countries rich and poor, 
technological leaders and laggards, inclusive and unemployment-ridden. This creates two 
potential problems. On one hand, there is a risk that national programmes would simply be 
laundry lists with no priority at all. On the other, if national programmes actually establish 
priorities among the 24 guidelines or simply ignore them altogether, it would be difficult for 
the Commission, which is in charge of evaluating national programmes, to pass a solid 
judgement on their validity. There is certainly no published document that provides guidance 
for selecting national priorities among the 24 guidelines.  
Discussions with Commission officials in fact left us with the impression that their evaluation 
of national programmes had to rely on common sense and on consensus prescriptions from 
international organisations, rather than on a set of ex ante priorities and a methodology for 
dealing with heterogeneity.  
The contrast with the OECD’s Going for Growth exercise, also launched in 2005, is striking. 
Confronted with a similar challenge – in fact a simpler one, as the organisation does not set 
out goals for the OECD area as a whole and only aims at giving advice on the policy packages 
that are best suited to individual countries’ needs – the OECD has defined and published its 
methodology
13. As developed in Annex 2, the OECD work starts, as in any benchmarking 
exercise, with the identification of each country’s performance weaknesses vis-à-vis clearly 
specified objectives such as employment and productivity. Then, a fixed number of policy 
priorities are identified, again for each country. The selected priorities are those with the 
highest potential for delivering an improvement on the performance weaknesses.  
The OECD methodology is certainly not without its own shortcomings. But at least it 
provides a reasonable explicit framework for undertaking consistent country-by-country 
assessments. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for Lisbon 2.  
Unlike the OECD, the EU is admittedly a political organisation with an agenda of its own and 
objectives that go beyond the maximisation of country-by-country performance indicators. 
But this does not make the task any simpler. On the contrary, it increases its difficulty. The 
example of R&D spending is again telling. The OECD considers it an instrument that may, or 
may not, feature among the policy priorities for individual countries. For the EU, however, it 
has been decreed as a common objective.  As indicated in Section 1, this immediately raises 
difficult questions: should R&D spending be a priority for every country? Or should national 
spending levels be chosen instead so as to equalise marginal returns on R&D spending across 
member states and maximise the overall  EU innovation capacity and growth potential? 
Depending on the answers to those questions, very different assessments can be given on 
national spending levels. Again, however, it does not seem that the EU has rigorously 
addressed those questions.  
As to the euro area dimension of the reform process also emphasized in Section 1, it is barely 
addressed within the framework of the Lisbon strategy. Euro area surveillance involves 
structural aspects but no explicit link is made with the National Reform Programmes, which 
do not include a euro area dimension. In principle, the euro area fiche prepared by the 
European Commission is recognition of a separate euro area dimension. However, in practice 
it does not go beyond the aggregation of individual country fiches. This may have the 
unfortunate effect of overlooking reforms that have an essential bearing on the functioning of 
the euro area, as the Commission does not base its evaluation of the national programmes on a 
proper analysis of the euro area priorities.  
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2.4 The NRPs and their evaluation: results  
The National Reform Programmes are very diverse in scope, ambition and degree of 
precision. Against this background, the Commission evaluation of those programmes often 
includes sensible remarks and suggestions that point to the weaknesses of national strategies. 
Thereby, the European Commission adds value in this collective exercise of reflection and 
assessment. 
In general, governments seem to have largely ignored the Integrated Guidelines when drafting 
their NRPs. These usually refer only vaguely – if at all – to them, raising the suspicion that in 
several cases NRPs consist simply of a repackaging of existing measures. What is even more 
disturbing is that in its assessments of the NRPs the Commission also refers to them very 
loosely. The apparent lack of relevance of the Integrated Guidelines in the process is most 
probably the result of the two problems identified in the previous section: the large number of 
guidelines and the lack of criteria for selecting those which should be pursued most 
vigorously by each member state. 
In some cases, however, the Guidelines are unambiguous and the policy emphasis is 
unmistakable.  It is thus useful to analyse two such cases, which are both essential to the 
Lisbon strategy and feature numerical targets: the participation rate of older workers (Lisbon 
target: 50% in 2010) and R&D spending (Lisbon target: 3% of GDP in 2010). Most EU 
members are underperforming on both accounts. In addition, these two policy areas can 
highlight different dimensions of the challenges involved in the design of a common strategy. 
As discussed in Section 1, structural heterogeneity and the existence of externalities are major 
issues in the case of investment in R&D, whereas they are less important for the participation 
rate, where learning can instead play a greater role. 
Annex Table 2 presents the situation for the participation of older workers. Of the 19 member 
states currently below the 50% target, only seven set a target in their NRP, sometimes actually 
below 50% or for a date later than 2010.  
Annex Table 3 provides similar results for R&D. Here, of the 23 member states that currently 
invest less than 3% of GDP in R&D, 18 set a target in the NRP
14, although sometimes it is 
less than 3%, or for a date different than 2010.  
 
Beyond the well defined issue of numerical targets, the degree of concreteness of the NRPs 
varies greatly from country to country and it is on average quite low. A commitment to 
deliver on Lisbon should rely – as stressed by some of the guidelines – on timetables, 
intermediate targets, benchmarks, a clear financial planning, the introduction of proper 
legal/fiscal incentives, and so on. The use of such instruments has been generally limited. 
With respect to plans for increasing the participation rate of older workers, some member 
states substitute concrete plans for numerical targets. But overall, most plans to increase the 
participation rates of older workers appear to lack concreteness. 
Overall, the Commission evaluation does not appear to follow the letter of the guidelines very 
closely, just as the NRPs themselves. Instead, the Commission’s assessment appears to focus 
on national prioritisation, although, as indicated above, an explicit methodology is lacking.  
We found it instructive to compare the reform priorities as implied by the Commission to 
those identified by the OECD
15.   As a proxy for the Commission’s take on national priorities, 
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we use the “major strengths and weaknesses” spelled out in the conclusion of the 
Commission’s assessment of the NRPs
16.  
Regarding the participation rate of older workers there seems to be a close correspondence 
between the Commission’s and the OECD’s prioritisation (Table 2). For the 19 EU countries 
that are OECD members, the Commission and OECD agree whether older worker 
participation is a priority or not in 15 cases (priority in 8 cases, no priority in 7). Even in the 
remaining four cases, there is only a weak
17 discrepancy between the two institutions. This 
suggests that the evaluation was more based on the prevailing consensus among international 
organisations than on a direct implementation of the guidelines.   
                                                                                                                                                          
15 In OECD (2005, 2006), national reform priorities are identified by the OECD for all EU member states other 
than the Baltic States, Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia.  
16 While, technically, these are not priorities as such (but priorities relative to the existing NRPs), in practice this 
is the most immediate indication of the Commission’s views regarding national priorities that is available to the 
public. 
17 All of these weak discrepancies are cases where neither Commission nor OECD lists older worker 
participation but either one (but not the other) lists a related reform issue such as disability benefits as a priority.    12
By contrast, we find little systematic correspondence of Commission and OECD priorities 
regarding R&D spending. For the 19 countries covered by both organisations, there is 
agreement on 7 countries and disagreement for 12. In 10 out of 12 cases, divergence is due to 
the Commission viewing an increase in R&D spending as a priority while the OECD, which 
focuses on innovation rather than R&D per se, does not; the reverse is observed only for the 
remaining two cases. Hence, the discrepancy is mainly driven by the fact that the Commission 
sees R&D as a priority for more countries than the OECD.  
There are two possible explanations for these patterns. On the one hand, it may be that the 
R&D priority is so intimately linked to the Lisbon agenda that it receives special, and possibly 
excessive emphasis by the Commission. On the other hand, it may be that the OECD’s 
methodology does not fully factor in cross-border spillover effects, which are at the core of 
the Lisbon agenda and therefore receive due attention by the Commission
18. The fact that 
most member states have committed to substantially increase R&D expenditures in their 
NRPs is consistent with the latter explanation.   
 
Summing up, in spite of some noticeable progress the new Lisbon process is far from what 
would be needed to effectively support the goals of the Lisbon agenda.  
  
 
3. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
3.1 Should Lisbon be saved?  
There were two problems with Lisbon 1: ineffective coordination and lack of political 
ownership. The so-called open method of coordination borrowed from the old “competition 
for performance” approach that had been used with success in the macroeconomic sphere, but 
could not rely on any strong incentive. To be effective, it would have required at the very 
least the setting up of a benchmarking framework. Unfortunately this was never done. Even 
then, this would have been benchmarking with neither sanction nor incentive, and therefore a 
very weak form of coordination. The second problem with Lisbon 1 was the lack of political 
ownership by national authorities. Altogether, therefore, Lisbon 1 had commendable goals 
and helped foster cross-country comparisons and increasing public awareness through the 
publication of statistics. But as regards implementation, it was essentially a low-quality, 
bureaucratic benchmarking enterprise.  
Lisbon 2 could have attempted to remedy the two dimensions of the problem, seeking to 
improve both the effectiveness of coordination and the degree of political ownership. This is 
essentially what the Kok report had suggested. Instead, Lisbon 2 chose to focus on the 
ownership problem. It was implicitly predicated on the assumption that the EU was 
confronted with a trade-off, and that more political ownership could only be gained at the 
expense of transparency in performance assessment. This was a questionable assumption in 
the first place.  
If the implementation of the Lisbon strategy actually requires effective coordination and a 
high degree of political ownership, then the new approach was unlikely to succeed where 
Lisbon 1 failed. Worse, Lisbon 2 does not seem to have succeeded in increasing the political 
ownership of the Lisbon strategy by national authorities. The preparation and adoption of 
National Reform Programmes is certainly an important and positive step but the examination 
undertaken here suggests that progress as regards ownership has not been significant, at least 
so far.  
                                                 
18 This also reflects the fact that the OECD does not see R&D as an end in itself but as an instrument.   13
These serious shortcomings of Lisbon 2 might call into question the whole Lisbon process. 
When a company or a state is confronted with a project and when that project does not 
deliver, the criterion for deciding whether to rescue or to drop it is not how much capital has 
already been invested, but whether the project still has value. The same applies to Lisbon: 
whatever political capital has been invested in it, it should be stopped if there is no value in it. 
The reason why we think that the Lisbon agenda should not be abandoned is that we still find 
value in it. We strongly believe that Lisbon continues to be crucial for the future of Europe. 
The Lisbon goals continue to reflect the major challenges that European economies are 
confronted in this age of accelerated globalisation and technological change. These goals and 
the recognition of interdependence that they embody still command wide consensus.   
However, we do not consider that Lisbon 2 is on track to succeed. On the contrary, our 
assessment is that it will fail unless its current shortcomings are addressed as a matter of 
urgency. It is the responsibility of the European Council of March 2006 to acknowledge the 
current weaknesses of the strategy and to correct them. 
3.2 Recommendations  
The weaknesses of Lisbon we have identified are the unevenness of the rationale, the 
weakness of the instruments and the inadequacy of the process. In order to salvage Lisbon 2, 
substantial corrective action in each area will be required. In addition, we see a case for 
addressing the euro area dimension of the reform process.  
 
Strengthen the rationale. The very nature of the Lisbon process implies EU involvement in 
policy domains that primarily belong to the responsibility of member states. The legitimacy of 
this involvement rests on the existence of a rationale for coordination or joint action. At 
present, this rationale is rendered confused by the number and complexity of guidelines and 
objectives. They need to be reduced to ensure greater consistency of the EU dimension of 
Lisbon 2. Also, the EU rationale of any item on the Lisbon 2 agenda should be spelled out 
explicitly. Otherwise, Lisbon 2 will in effect be continued to be treated like a Christmas tree: 
everybody would continue trying to add everything they feel strongly about, recreating the 
lack of focus that marred Lisbon 1.  
 
Reinforce the instruments. The Kok report had proposed to use three instruments for 
implementing Lisbon: National Reform Programmes, benchmarking with peer pressure and 
the EU budget. We deplore the fact that Lisbon 2 has retained only the first instrument. 
Benchmarking and appropriate EU funding are also crucial for the success of Lisbon.    
Along with the National Reform Programmes, peer pressure and benchmarking should be 
integral parts of the political process that underpins Lisbon 2. Transparency benefits the 
democratic process as it empowers national electorates to review the performance of their 
own governments and it helps focus the public debate on key areas of underperformance. The 
use of league tables facilitates this process. 
Also, the EU budget would need to be substantially amended in order to better reflect the 
Lisbon priorities. The budget review in 2008 will, in that sense, be a critical litmus test. 
The example of Research and Development illustrates well how benchmarking and the EU 
budget need to complement National Reform Programmes. The commitment by member 
states to increased R&D expenditures is certainly one of the notable achievements of the 
NRPs and of new Lisbon process to date. But equally important is a commitment to improve 
the quality of R&D policy, both as regards the efficiency of public R&D and the effectiveness 
of incentives to private R&D. Here, benchmarking ought to play a leading role. At the same   14
time, it is clear that, given the scope of R&D externalities within the Union, there is a case for 
R&D spending at the EU level. The fragmentation of public R&D funding along national 
lines in Europe is increasingly inefficient. Provided EU research programmes are adequately 
managed, the European economy as a whole would benefit from an increased R&D spending 
effort at the European level.      
Improve the process. The new Lisbon strategy has put the NRPs at the centre of the process. 
We have assessed here their two central facets: ownership by member states and methodology 
design and implementation by the Commission. We strongly believe that both facets need to 
be improved. 
While national ownership of the reform agenda was meant to be a key feature of Lisbon 2, the 
outcome in this respect has been mixed at best. Based on our findings, we would recommend 
that member states strive to adopt minimum standards regarding the involvement of 
parliaments and the transparency of follow-up arrangements. Also, the Commission should 
make use of media impact analysis and opinion polls to measure successes and failures of 
bringing the whole process closer to the ultimate sovereign, namely the peoples of Europe. 
The process of designing and evaluating the NRPs would benefit greatly from a more explicit 
methodology for determining national priorities and evaluating reform plans. This will require 
a major conceptual and analytical push on the part of the Commission. At the moment, the 
methodological underpinnings of Lisbon 2 are much weaker than those of the OECD Going 
for Growth project, although the goals of Lisbon are more ambitious. An improved 
methodology will need to make the evaluation of national programmes and policies consistent 
with the underlying rationale for EU engagement in different areas. In practice, this means a 
more systematic and consistent comparative assessment of the quality of national policies in 
areas such as employment, and concrete recommendations to member states for action in 
areas such as R&D where the rationale is interdependence. The latter would help ensuring 
that the goodwill shown by EU countries in their NRP translates into actual deeds for 
promoting innovation, and that R&D efforts are increased where they have the best potential 
for efficiency.  
 
Address the euro dimension. Reform interdependence within the euro area is significantly 
stronger that in the EU as a whole, but this does not translate into effective policy processes. 
What is required is first recognition of this interdependence through a greater common 
ownership of reform programmes in the euro area. This should call for extending the practice 
of holding meetings of ministers of the euro area beyond the Eurogroup, including, if well 
prepared, at the European council level. Second, the National Reform Programmes and their 
evaluation by the Commission should derive policy priorities from the need to improve the 
functioning of the euro area and to redress harmful divergence within it. The euro area 
evaluation should go beyond a mere aggregation and be used as a basis for developing a euro 
area reform programme discussed within the Eurogroup.  
There is urgency to define a reform agenda for the countries in the euro area. The economy 
seems set to rebound in the short run, but for the recovery to be lasting the reforms that will 
pay off in two or three years and enhance the potential for non-inflationary growth have to be 
undertaken without delay. A joint commitment to such reforms by the governments of the 
euro area could and should be met with a more accommodative response from the ECB and 
would thereby enhance the potential for redressing the disappointing performance of the last 




There is still value in the Lisbon agenda. But despite last year’s reforms, it is still not 
effectively supported by the Lisbon process. This continued discrepancy between ends and 
means puts the whole strategy at risk. To prevent a failure of the joint endeavour, the 2006 
Spring European Council should urgently request from the European Commission a proposal 
to simplify and prioritise the guidelines; the Commission should develop a methodology for 
the assessment of the National Reform Programmes and it should resume the publication of 
comparative performance assessment tables; the member states should ensure better national 
ownership of their reform commitments; and the Eurogroup should start preparing a proper 
euro area reform programme.  
Those are immediate stopgap measures only. In the medium run, we remain convinced that 
the Lisbon agenda must be  more strongly  buttressed by Community policies and the EU 
budget. But difficulty in building a medium-term consensus should be no excuse for short-
term inaction.   
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Annex 1 – R&D externalities within the European Union 
 
The scope for R&D externalities within the European Union is large. Several transmission 
mechanisms are at play and their role is especially strong in Europe. A first natural way for 
knowledge to spread across borders is through direct contacts between researchers, the 
movement of qualified workers, international conferences, joint research projects and so on. 
 
But knowledge can spread also through commercial contacts, such as foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and trade.
19 Inward FDI has for long time been thought to originate 
knowledge spillovers through the creation of clusters, reverse engineering, training of 
qualified workers, and so on. More recently, empirical research has shown that outward FDI 
can also be beneficial: spillovers go in both directions.
20 
 
A third channel is trade. Recent economic literature has shown that importing knowledge-
intensive intermediate goods may allow firms to benefit from positive externalities stemming 
from research conducted abroad, even if it is difficult to exactly quantify the effects.
21 This 
does not mean that it is possible to free-ride on the R&D conducted abroad: to be able to reap 
the benefits of foreign innovation it is indeed crucial that firms and countries perform a 
relevant amount of R&D of their own. This highlights the desirability of a coordinated effort 
at the EU level. 
 
The rationale for concerted efforts in R&D in the EU is then very strong. The high flows of 
within-EU trade and investment are likely to generate important cross border externalities. 
However, member states will be able to capture all the benefits generated from research 
conducted in other member states only if a coordinated effort is promoted. 
                                                 
19 For a comprehensive review of the literature, see Keller (2004). 
20 See, for instance, Branstetter (2006). 
21 The empirical literature originated from the seminal paper by Coe and Helpman (1995).   18
Annex 2 – The OECD methodology for selecting country-specific priorities 
 
The overall methodology the OECD uses to select priorities for structural reforms is outlined 
in the Annex 1.A.2 to the 2005 Going for Growth
 22. In 2006, the same approach was adapted 
to the specific case of innovation.
23 
 
The identification of priorities is based on a two-step procedure: 
 
1.  The identification of performance weaknesses. 
A series of indicators aimed at measuring economic performance is outlined. These 
include, among others, labour productivity and unemployment (for the labour market) 
or R&D and patent intensities (for innovation). A country’s performance is then 
evaluated using the OECD average as a benchmark. 
 
2.  The identification of weaknesses in policy instruments. 
A series of policy indicators aimed at assessing policy tools is outlined. These reflect 
instruments that are under direct control of the government and that are known to have 
an impact on performance. These include, among others, the implicit tax on continued 
work (for the labour market) or the protection of intellectual property rights (for 
innovation). Again, the policy stance of a country is evaluated against the OECD 
average. 
 
When a country has both a weak performance with respect to an indicator and a weak policy 
response in that domain, the corresponding policy is selected as a priority. Moreover, to 
reflect the possibility that some policy areas might be hardly synthesised by quantitative 
indicators, two further policy priorities are selected. These are based on country expertise and 
may or may not be reflected in the indicators. A total of 5 recommendations for labour 
market, and four for innovation policy reforms is then set out. 
 
The fixed number of policy priorities for each country implies that for the worst performing 
economies some relevant policies will be left out. Similarly, for the best performing some 
priorities may address dimensions where the country is doing better than the OECD average. 
                                                 
22 See OECD (2005),  pp 31-36 and OECD (2006), pp 76-77, for more details. 
23 OECD (2005) focused on labour and product markets; OECD (2006) follows up in these two areas and 
broadens the analysis to innovation policy.   19
 
Prepare Briefing Books
Assessment of NRPs 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION EUROPEAN COUNCIL  MEMBER STATES
Spring Council 2005 
Spring Council 2006 
Adoption of Integrated Guidelines 
Adoption of Updated Integrated Guidelines and Recommendations
Issue NRPs
Consultations
Source : European Commission (2005b)
Annex 3 – The Preparation and Evaluation of National Reform Programmes (NRPs)  20
 
Annex Table 1 - Ownership Index 
                 
Country Parliament  Social  Civil  Follow-up  Total 
   (1)  Partners (2)  Society (2)  (3)    
Austria 3  2  2  0  7 
Belgium 0  3  0  0  3 
Cyprus 3  2  0  2  7 
Czech Republic  3  3  0  0  6 
Denmark 1  3  3  0  7 
Estonia 2  3  3  3  11 
Finland 1  2  2  0  5 
France 2  2  0  1  5 
Germany 1  1  0  0  2 
Greece 2  2  2  1  7 
Hungary 1  2  2  0  5 
Ireland 3  2  0  0  5 
Italy 1  2  2  0  5 
Latvia 3  2  2  0  7 
Lithuania 3  2  2  0  7 
Luxembourg 3  3 0  0  6 
Malta 1  2  0  3  6 
Netherlands 3 2  0  0  5 
Poland 3  2  2  0  7 
Portugal 2  2  0  0  4 
Slovakia 2  3  2  0  7 
Slovenia 1  2  0  2  5 
Spain 3  2  0  2  7 
Sweden 3  2  1  0  6 
United Kingdom  0  1  1  0  2 
       Averages    
(1) Parliament:  0 = no involvement    Overall  5,8 
  1 = informed      EU15  5,1 
  2 = committee level    New MS  6,8 
  3 = broad involvement/plenary discussion  6 Largest  4,7 
       Small MS  6,1 
(2) Social Partners/Civil Society:  0 = no involvement    
         1 = informed      
    2 = consultation    
    3 = major involvement    
         
(3) Follow-up:  0 = no follow-up      
  1 = committee      
  2 = at minister level      
  3 = at prime minister level      
         
Sources: European Commission (2006), National Reform Programmes   
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Annex Table 2 - Participation Rate of Older Workers 
                 
Country Current  (1)  NRP 
Target (2)
EC Evaluation (3)  OECD 
   (%) (%)  Priority  Assessment  Priority 
Austria 28,8     yes -  yes 
Belgium 30,0  50,0  yes  +  yes 
      (asap)          
Cyprus 49,9  53,0  no      n/a 
Czech 
Republic 
42,7 47,5 no      no 
      (2008)          
Denmark  60,3     no     (yes) 
Estonia  52,4     no     n/a 
Finland 50,9     yes  -  yes 
France 37,3      yes -  yes 
Germany  41,8     no     (yes) 
Greece  39,4     no     (yes) 
Hungary  31,1     no     no 
Ireland  49,5     no     no 
Italy 30,5      (yes)  (-) no 
Latvia 47,9  50,0  no     n/a 
Lithuania 47,1 50,0 no      n/a 
Luxemburg 30,8      yes  -  yes 
Malta 31,5  35,0  no      n/a 
Netherlands 45,2      yes  +  (yes) 
Poland 26,2     (yes)  (-)  (yes) 
Portugal 50,3  50,0  no      no 
Slovakia 26,8     (yes) (+)  (yes) 
Slovenia 29,0 35,0  yes  -  n/a 
      (2008)          
Spain  41,3     no     no 
Sweden  69,1     no     no 
United 
Kingdom 
56,2     no     no 
          
(1) Data refer to 2004; Lisbon target is 50%.    
(2) For 2010 if not otherwise stated.       
(3) Priority:   "yes" means tat the issue is cited in the conclusions of the EC assessment. 
  A parenthesis means it has been referred to only indirectly. 
     
Assessment:  "+" = on track       
  "-"  = not realistic/not enough     
          
Sources: European Commission (2006), National Reform Programmes, OECD (2005,2006)   22
 
 
Annex Table 3 - Research and Development Spending (% of GDP) 
                       
Country  Current (1)  NRP Target (2)  EC Evaluation (3)  OECD 
   Total Public  Total  Public  Priority  Assessment Priority
Austria 2,26  0,86  3,00      yes  o  no 
Belgium 1,93  0,61  3,00      no  o  no 
Cyprus 0,37  0,29  0,65      yes  o  n/a 
         (2008)             
Czech Republic  1,28  0,47     1,00  yes  +  no 
Denmark 2,63  0,82  3,00      yes  +  no 
Estonia 0,91  0,55  1,90      yes  +  n/a 
Finland  3,51  1,05  4,00     yes     no 
France  2,16  0,80  3.00 (5)     (yes)     no 
Germany 2,49  0,74  3,00      (yes)  o  no 
Greece 0,58  0,41  1,50      yes  -  (yes) 
Hungary  0,89  0,52        no     yes 
Ireland  1,20 0,43 2.50  (4)      yes  -  (yes) 
         (2013)             
Italy  1,14  0,60        no     (yes) 
Latvia 0,42  0,23  1,50      yes  +  n/a 
      0,00  (2008)             
Lithuania 0,76  0,60  2,00      yes  o  n/a 
Luxembourg 1,78  0,20  3,00     yes  o  no 
Malta 0,29  0,19    0,20  no  -  n/a 
            (2007)          
Netherlands  1,77  0,75  3.00 (5)     no     no 
Poland 0,58  0,41  1,65      yes  -  yes 
         (2008)             
Portugal  0,78  0,52     1,00  yes     yes 
Slovakia  0,53  0,27        yes  -  no 
Slovenia 1,61  0,65  3,00      yes  -  n/a 
Spain 1,07  0,49  2,00      yes  +  no 
Sweden 3,74  0,99      1,00  yes  +  no 
United Kingdom  1,88  0,64  2,50     yes  -  yes 
         (2014)             
             
(1) Data refer to 2004. For Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and UK, they refer to 2003.   
(2) For 2010 if not otherwise stated.           
(3) Priority:   "yes" = The issue is cited in the conclusions of the EC assessment.   
 
A parenthesis means it has been referred to only 
indirectly.    
     Assessment:  "+" = on track           
  "o" = ambitious but achievable if efforts are stepped up     
  "-"  = not realistic/not enough         
(4) Percentage of GNP.             
(5) France and the Netherlands announced targets after the transmission of their programmes   
Sources: European Commission (2006), Frank (2006), 
 National Reform Programmes, OECD (2005,2006)